NDLI: Probabilistic punishment on free riders in threshold public goods games

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Zhang Chunyan Liu Zhongxin Sun Qinglin Chen Zengqiang
Copyright Year	2015
Description	Author affiliation: Dept. of Autom., Nankai Univ., Tianjin, China (Zhang Chunyan; Liu Zhongxin; Sun Qinglin; Chen Zengqiang)
Abstract	We focus our attention on the effectiveness of punishing defectors in the evolution of cooperation in rational populations within the threshold public goods game models. We establish two scenarios: defectors will suffer possible punishment whether the game succeeds or not, and defectors will incur punishment only when game fails. A key observation of this paper is that given this assumption, punishing free riders can significantly influence the evolution outcomes, and the results are driven by the specific components of the punishing rule. Particularly, probably punishing defectors always, not only when game fails, can be more effective for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total contributions. Intriguingly when defectors face punishment only when game fails, the spread and domination of cooperators can not be ensured even by sufficiently large punishment, which already brings payoff advantages of defectors over cooperators. Further, cooperators are best supported by the large punishment on defectors, and then dominate and stabilize in the population, under the premise that defectors always incur punishment regardless of whether the game ends successfully or not. We hope this work provides some intriguing hints or insights on investigating the collective behaviors by the aid of punishment mechanism.
Starting Page	9110
Ending Page	9114
File Size	129751
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9789881563897
ISSN	19341768
DOI	10.1109/ChiCC.2015.7261080
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2015-07-28
Publisher Place	China
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Technical Committee on Control Theory, Chinese Association of Automation
Subject Keyword	Evolution (biology) Sociology Cooperation Games Public Goods Game Probabilistic logic System-on-chip Statistics Game theory Evolutionary Game Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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