NDLI: The evolution of reputation-based partner-switching behaviors with a cost

Content Provider	PubMed Central
Author	Li, Yixiao
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	Humans constantly adjust their social relationships and choose new partners of good reputations, thereby promoting the evolution of cooperation. Individuals have to pay a cost to build a reputation, obtain others' information and then make partnership adjustments, yet the conditions under which such costly behaviors are able to evolve remain to be explored. In this model, I assume that individuals have to pay a cost to adjust their partnerships. Furthermore, whether an individual can adjust his partnership based on reputation is determined by his strategic preference, which is updated via coevolution. Using the metaphor of a public goods game where the collective benefit is shared among all members of a group, the coupling dynamics of cooperation and partnership adjustment were numerically simulated. Partner-switching behavior cannot evolve in a public goods game with a low amplification factor. However, such an effect can be exempted by raising the productivity of public goods or the frequency of partnership adjustment. Moreover, costly partner-switching behavior is remarkably promoted by the condition that the mechanism of reputation evaluation considers its prosociality. A mechanism of reputation evaluation that praises both cooperative and partner-switching behaviors allows them to coevolve.
Related Links	http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep05957
Starting Page	5957
File Format	PDF
ISSN	20452322
e-ISSN	20452322
Journal	Scientific Reports
Volume Number	4
Language	English
Publisher	Nature Publishing Group
Publisher Date	2014-08-01
Access Restriction	Open
Rights Holder	Nature Publishing Group
Subject Keyword	Science and technology Research in Higher Education
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Multidisciplinary

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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