NDLI: Actions of the two sides in the dynamic selective law enforcement game

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Zhang Yun-hui Zhang Yu-bin
Copyright Year	2010
Description	Author affiliation: Economics School, Harbin University of Science and Technology, P.R. China, 150040 (Zhang Yun-hui) \|\| Management School, Harbin University of Commerce, P.R. China, 150028 (Zhang Yu-bin)
Abstract	In the framework of optimal law enforcement theory, the existed literatures have analyzed the acts of selective law enforcement under the static conditions. In this paper, we use incomplete information dynamic game model to analyze the process of dynamic game between law enforcers and potential offenders. The result shows that the potential offenders can get relevant enforcement information such as the punishments intensity by observing, studying, and predicting the situations. Then they will modify their behaviors to avoid penalty based on this information. These opportunistic behaviors not only bring the inefficient allocation of resources, but also damage the credibility and justice of the law. To solve this problem, we need to introduce the public oversight mechanism and regulate the behaviors of law enforcers.
Starting Page	1892
Ending Page	1898
File Size	104223
Page Count	7
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424481163
ISSN	21551855
e-ISBN	9781424481194
DOI	10.1109/ICMSE.2010.5720037
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2010-11-24
Publisher Place	Australia
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Economics Analytical models Law enforcement Bayesian methods Biological system modeling selective law enforcement Games perfect bayesian equilibrium potential offender IEEE Potentials enforcement cost
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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