NDLI: An impact-aware defense against Stuxnet

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Clark, A. Quanyan Zhu Poovendran, R. Basar, T.
Copyright Year	2013
Description	Author affiliation: Coordinated Sci. Lab., Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA (Quanyan Zhu; Basar, T.) \|\| Dept. of Electr. Eng., Univ. of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA (Clark, A.; Poovendran, R.)
Abstract	The Stuxnet worm is a sophisticated malware designed to sabotage industrial control systems (ICSs). It exploits vulnerabilities in removable drives, local area communication networks, and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to penetrate the process control network (PCN) and the control system network (CSN). Stuxnet was successful in penetrating the control system network and sabotaging industrial control processes since the targeted control systems lacked security mechanisms for verifying message integrity and source authentication. In this work, we propose a novel proactive defense system framework, in which commands from the system operator to the PLC are authenticated using a randomized set of cryptographic keys. The framework leverages cryptographic analysis and control-and game-theoretic methods to quantify the impact of malicious commands on the performance of the physical plant. We derive the worst-case optimal randomization strategy as a saddle-point equilibrium of a game between an adversary attempting to insert commands and the system operator, and show that the proposed scheme can achieve arbitrarily low adversary success probability for a sufficiently large number of keys. We evaluate our proposed scheme, using a linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) as a case study, through theoretical and numerical analysis.
Starting Page	4140
Ending Page	4147
File Size	376811
Page Count	8
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781479901777
ISSN	07431619
e-ISBN	9781479901784
DOI	10.1109/ACC.2013.6580475
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2013-06-17
Publisher Place	USA
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	American Automatic Control Council(AACC)
Subject Keyword	Control systems Cryptography Grippers Industrial control Malware Software
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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