NDLI: The Principal-Agent Models about Risk Seeking Players

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Dongdong Hua
Copyright Year	2011
Abstract	The principal-agent model, which is used to study the incentive problem in corporate and in western countries, is generally under the assumptions that principal being risk neutral and agent being risk aversion. By analyzing, the organization's risk attitude, which is jointly determined by decision maker's risk attitude, competition situation of the industry and external environment, is likely to be risk neutral and risk seeking in China. So, when studying the incentive problem between organizations in China, the existing assumptions should be viewed as enormously restrictive and the conclusion should be not valid everywhere. Two models, one that is the principal being risk seeking and agent being risk neutral, the other that is principal being risk seeking and agent being risk seeking ,will be structured. In order to compare with risk aversion, measure of absolute risk seeking and the gain associated to the risk are defined. The optimal incentive contract declare that the agent will share either all or no risk; boundary conditions depend on the value of parameters which are risk, measure of absolute risk seeking and the cost of effort.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	4
File Size	239684
Page Count	4
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424465798
e-ISBN	9781424465811
DOI	10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5998354
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-08-12
Publisher Place	China
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Economics Presses Uncertainty Biological system modeling Psychology Organizations Contracts
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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