NDLI: On the consistency of leaders' conjectures in hierarchical games

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Kulkarni, A.A. Shanbhag, U.V.
Copyright Year	2013
Description	Author affiliation: Dept. of Ind. & Manuf. Eng., Penn. State Univ., University Park, PA, USA (Shanbhag, U.V.) \|\| Syst. & Control Eng. group at the Indian Inst. of Technol., Mumbai, India (Kulkarni, A.A.)
Abstract	In multi-leader multi-follower games, a set of leaders compete in a Nash game, while anticipating the equilibrium arising from a game between a set of followers. Conventional formulations are complicated by several concerns. First, since follower equilibria need not be unique, conjectures made by leaders regarding follower equilibria may not be consistent at equilibrium. When the follower equilibrium is a physical quantity to be exchanged, one is led to ask whether an equilibrium without consistent conjectures is even sensible. Second, these games are often irregular and nonconvex and no general sufficiency conditions for existence of equilibria are known. Third, no globally convergent algorithms for computing equilibria are known. We show that these concerns are addressed en masse by a modified model we introduce in this paper. In this model each leader makes conjectures while also requiring that his conjectures are consistent with those made by other leaders. If leader payoff functions admit a potential function, then under mild conditions, this model admits an equilibrium. At equilibrium, the conjectures of leaders are necessarily consistent, and when there is a unique follower equilibrium, the equilibria of the original model are equilibria of the new model. Preliminary empirical evidence suggests that such equilibria are also significantly easier to compute.
Sponsorship	IEEE Control Syst. Soc.
Starting Page	1180
Ending Page	1185
File Size	338805
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781467357142
ISSN	07431546
e-ISBN	9781467357173
DOI	10.1109/CDC.2013.6760042
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2013-12-10
Publisher Place	Italy
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Games Computational modeling Optimization Lead Standards Educational institutions Power markets
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Control and Optimization Control and Systems Engineering Modeling and Simulation

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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