| Headnote |
Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970: r.27 – Challengeto r.27 as being ultravires particularly with reference to decision ofSupreme Court in All India Judges Association – High Court rejectedthe challenge – Held: High Court rightly rejected challenge to r.27because this residuary clause in the Rules of 1970 does not offendthe law declared in All India Judges Association in any manner – Thisresiduary clause is not of equating the judicial officers with theexecutive officers but only provides that in regard to the matters forwhich no provision or insufficient provision has been made in theRules of 1970, the relevant rules, directions or orders as applicableto IAS shall regulate the conditions of service of the officers ofDHJS – A perusal of the other provisions in the Rules of 1970 makesit clear that reference to the service conditions of the members ofIAS is not an anathema to these rules and, on the contrary, wherevernecessary, the applicable rules, orders or directions concerningthe members of IAS do govern the service conditions of the judicialofficers too – High Court establishment provided by way of theimpugned resolutions norms for promotion while taking cue fromthe norms applicable to the members of IAS in the equivalent payscale – Providing for such norms does not in any manner stand atconflict with the principles laid down in the case of All India JudgesAssociation.Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970: Merit-cum-seniority – Criteria for promotion to the posts of District and SessionsJudges – Implementation of revised criteria in phased manner –Challenged – Held: High Court, in its Full Court meeting dated28.04.2009 had adopted a resolution to the effect that, for beingselected/promoted as District and Sessions Judge, a candidate ofDHJS ought to fulfil the criteria of possessing at least two ‘A’ (very good) and three ‘B+’ (good) ACR gradings for the preceding five years from the date of consideration for such appointment –Thereafter, in its Full Court meeting dated 15.01.2010, the HighCourt proceeded to modify the said criteria to the effect that acandidate of DHJS ought to possess the minimum ‘A’ (very good)grading in ACRs of each of the five years under consideration – Asagainst resolution dated 15.01.2010, the High Court received certainrepresentations, including those from the Associations of the Officersand, upon consideration of these representations, a committeecomprising of four Judges recommended for implementation of therevised criteria in a phased manner; and such recommendations ofthe committee were accepted by the Full Court of the High Court –In the given fact situation and the methodology of gradualimplementation adopted by the High Court, the suggestion on thepart of the appellant that there had been any so-called retrospectiveoperation of revised criteria was totally bereft of substance – Inview of the duties and responsibilities attached with the higher postsof District and Sessions Judge and Principal Judge, Family Court,the High Court cannot be faulted in providing for a reasonablemethod of assessment of the requisite merit in the manner that acandidate in the zone of consideration ought to be possessingminimum five “very good” ACRs in the preceding five years fromthe base year – In fact, the criteria so adopted had been the identicalone as provided for the members of IAS in the equivalent pay scales– High Court did not change the eligibility criteria for appointmentto the post of District and Session Judge or Principal Judge, FamilyCourt but merely evolved a selection criteria for evaluation of eligiblecandidates – There was no denial of a pre-existing right of theappellant, who entered the zone of consideration only in the year2014-15 whereas, the criteria in question was implemented forappointments made from the year 2012.Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970: r.27 – Whetherthe appellant was denied fair and reasonable consideration of hercase for promotion to the posts of District and Sessions Judge/Principal judge, Family Court by operation of criteria laid down inthe impugned resolutions – Held: Appellant was a member of DHJS– By virtue of r.27, she would be deemed to be having constructiveknowledge that the criteria to be adopted for upward progressionwould be that as applicable for the equivalent posts in IAS – Whenit had consistently been provided that for promotion to the scale ofRs. 18,400-22,400 and above, the prescribed benchmark of “verygood” ought to be met in all ACRs of five years under consideration;and when the higher posts of District and Sessions Judge andPrincipal Judge, Family Court do carry much higher scales of pay,neither the High Court could be faulted in applying the samebenchmark for such higher posts in DHJS nor the appellant couldfeign ignorance about the same – Apart from that in the 1970 Rules,the entry level promotion to the post in DHJS is on the basis ofmerit-cum-seniority or merit – In the light of such requirements, anyupward progression in DHJS could only be on the higherrequirements of merit and in any case, such requirements cannot belesser than the requirements at entry level – Appellant was consciousof the fact that for upward movement in DHJS, merit would acquireprimacy; and that seniority alone was not going to be decisive forpromotion to the higher posts of District and Sessions Judge andthe Principal Judge, Family Court – Appellant was also consciousof the position that while making any such promotion, the assessmentwould be based on the competitive merit of the candidates in thezone of consideration; and if any candidate in such zone ofconsideration was possessed of better merit than herself, he wouldbe preferred for promotion – Thus, appellant was not denied fairand reasonable consideration of her case for promotion to the postsof District and Sessions Judge/ Principal Judge, Family Court byoperation of the criteria laid down in the impugned resolutions.Judicial Officer – ACR grading – Whether the appellantsuffered any prejudice in the matter of ACR grading – It is not indispute that the appellant was informed of every grading made inher ACR – She was awarded ‘B+’ (good) in the years 2010, 2011,2012 and 2013; and ‘A’ (very good) in the year 2014 – Materialplaced on record showed that the appellant never challenged hergradings for any year except that for the year 2011 when sherequested for upgradation of her ACR grading from ‘B’ to ‘B+’ or‘A’; and the High Court, acceding to her request, upgraded herACR to ‘B+’ – Impugned resolution dated 27.01.2011 came to beadopted after due consideration of the representations made to theHigh Court and in conformity with the criteria provided by theGovernment of India for the posts equivalent in scale to that ofDistrict Judges – However, the criteria of having ‘A’ (very good)grading in the preceding five years was implemented in a phasedmanner – Appellant, not being oblivious of the position that for anyupward progression in DHJS, comparative merit would be a keyfactor, chose to remain contented with her grading at ‘B+’ in therelevant years and did not question the same at the appropriatetime and in appropriate manner – That being the position, theappellant cannot be acceded the right to contend now and at thisstage that the ACR gradings have operated adverse to her – Whileraising grievance with regard to the impact and effect of ACRgradings, the appellant appears to have missed out the fundamentalfactor that for the promotions in question, an individual’s minimummerit, by itself, was not going to be decisive; but the relevant factorwas going to be comparative merit of the persons in the zone ofconsideration – That being the position, when the persons in zoneof consideration possessing ‘A’ (very good) grading have beenpromoted in preference to her, the appellant cannot raise a grievanceabout her gradings after such promotions – Appellant was not ableto establish that she had suffered any prejudice in the matter ofACR gradings. |
