| Headnote |
Issue for consideration: The respondent No. 4 herein was appointed as the Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University, his tenure was for a period four years. As the tenure of the respondent No. 4 was coming to an end, the Chancellor initiated steps for selection and appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor. The Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education, State of Kerala issued notification inviting applications from eligible candidates. However, the respondent no. 4 herein was re-appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University after the Minister for Higher Education and Social Justice addressed a letter to the Governor/Chancellor dated 22.11.2021 recommending reappointment of the respondent No. 4 herein for a second term. (i) Whether re-appointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post; (ii) Whether the outer age limit of sixty years for the appointment of Vice-Chancellor as stipulated under sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Kannur University Act, 1996 is to be made applicable even in the case of re-appointment of the Vice-Chancellor for one more term of four years (iii) Whether the re-appointment of the ViceChancellor has to follow the same process as a fresh appointment by setting up a selection committee under Section 10(1) of the Act 1996 (iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor. Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post:Held: The ordinary meaning that can be ascribed to the term “reappointment” is the act or process of deciding essentially that someone should continue in a particular job – Ordinarily, the object behind providing for reappointment is twofold – First is “retention” i.e., where the incumbent to the office/post during his term is found to be extraordinary and has established himself or herself to be an asset to the institution, then in such circumstance, such person is retained with a view to allow him to continue on the same post for one more term – Secondly, having regard to the nature of the post the organization or institution may not be in a position to fill up the post in a time bound manner and in such circumstances, the provision for reappointment may enable the organization or institution to relieve itself of the tedium of going through the entire selection process afresh every time the post becomes vacant – Therefore, the reappointment is permissible even in case of a tenure post. [Paras 46 and 47] Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether the outer age limit of sixty years for the appointment of ViceChancellor as stipulated under sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act, 1996 is to be made applicable even in the case of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor for one more term of four years.Held: On a plain reading of sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996, it appears that the person sought to be appointed as a Vice-Chancellor must not be more than sixty-years of age at the time of appointment i.e., it provides the outer age limit for appointment – While sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 provides that upon appointment, the term of the ViceChancellor would be for four years and that he shall be eligible for reappointment – The proviso attached to sub-section (10) stipulates that no person shall be appointed as Vice-Chancellor for more than two terms – Sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 will apply only at the stage of appointment of ViceChancellor and would have no application whatsoever when it comes to reappointment of Vice-Chancellor under sub-section (10) – This is reinforced from the words “shall be eligible for reappointment” occurring in sub-section (10) which connotes that the same is an enabling provision whereby the Vice-Chancellor by virtue of holding his office is deemed eligible for reappointment irrespective of the other provisions – If the outer age limit provided in sub-section (9) would apply even to reappointment, then the same would effectively mean that only those persons who are appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of fifty-five or below could be considered for reappointment – Such an interpretation would result in conditions being read into sub-section (10) which have not been prescribed by the legislature – Had the intent of legislature been otherwise, sub-section (10) or the words “shall be eligible for re-appointment” would have been specifically qualified by or made subject to the words “sub-section (9)” or “provisions of this section” – If sub-section (9) is interpreted so as to be made applicable even to reappointment as provided in sub-section (10), then the result would be that any person who is appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of fifty-six or more would not be eligible for reappointment, thereby rendering subsection (10) and its proviso completely otiose and meaningless in such cases – A purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to the statutory provisions – Thus, the outer age limit of sixty years provided in sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 will not apply, when it comes to reappointment under sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996. [Paras 48, 50, 52, 53, 56, 57] Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether the reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to follow the same process as a fresh appointment by setting up a selection committee under Section 10(1) of the Act 1996.Held: Reappointment of Vice-Chancellor has been provided under sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 – The proviso to sub-section (10) of the Act 1996 further makes the intention of the legislature to provide for reappointment more clear – The legislature has not thought fit to prescribe any particular procedure or any particular mode or manner of reappointment – The UGC Regulations are also silent as regards the reappointment of Vice-Chancellor – In the case at hand, sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act, 1996, provides for reappointment and does not even contain the words “subject to provisions of this section” – This is as good as to reflect the legislature’s intention of permitting reappointment without following the ordinary process of appointment of ViceChancellor – Thus, it is not necessary to follow the procedure of appointment as laid down in Section 10 of the Act 1996 for the purpose of reappointment. [Paras 58, 65, 66] Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor.Held: The facts make it abundantly clear that there was no independent application of mind or satisfaction or judgment on the part of the Chancellor and the respondent No. 4 came to be reappointed only at the behest of the State Government – Although the notification reappointing the respondent No. 4 to the post of Vice-Chancellor was issued by the Chancellor yet the decision stood vitiated by the influence of extraneous considerations or to put it in other words by the unwarranted intervention of the State Government – It is the Chancellor who has been conferred with the competence under the Act 1996 to appoint or reappoint a Vice-Chancellor – No other person even the Pro-Chancellor or any superior authority can interfere with the functioning of the statutory authority and if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on a suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal – Thus, it is the decision-making process, which vitiated the entire process of reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor – The decision making process because in such a case the exercise of power is amenable to judicial review – As a consequence, the notification dated 23.11.2021, reappointing the respondent no.4 as the Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University is quashed. [Paras 81,84, 85,86,87,90] Words and Phrases – ‘Tenure’ and ‘Tenure post’ – Discussed. Interpretation of Statutes – Doctrine/Principle – Doctrine of Purposive construction:Held: The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to the statutory provisions, and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable – The rules of interpretation require that construction which carries forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred looking into the text and context of the statute – Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose – The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility – The provision of the statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative – The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute was enacted as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus legislative futility must be ruled out. [Para 56] Administrative Law – Principle:Held: It is a well settled principle of administrative law that if a statute expressly confers a statutory power on a particular body or authority or imposes a statutory duty on the same, then such power must be exercised or duty performed (as the case may) by that very body or authority itself and none other – If the body or authority exercises the statutory power or performs the statutory duty acting at the behest, or on the dictate, of any other body or person, then this is regarded as an abdication of the statutory mandate and any decision taken on such basis is contrary to law and liable to be quashed – It is important to keep in mind that, in law, it matters not that the extraneous element is introduced (i.e., the advice, recommendation, approval, etc. of the person not empowered by the statute is obtained or given) in good faith or for the advancement of any goal or objection howsoever laudable or desirable – The rule of law requires that a statutory power vests in the body or authority where the statute so provides, and likewise, the discharge of the statutory duty is the responsibility of the body or authority to which it is entrusted – That body or authority cannot merely rubberstamp an action taken elsewhere or simply endorse or ratify the decision of someone else. [Para 71] Writ – Writ of Quo Warranto:Held: Quo warranto is a remedy or procedure whereby the State inquires into the legality of the claim which a party asserts to an office or franchise, and to oust him from its enjoyment if the claim be not well founded, or to have the same declared forfeited and recover it, if, having once been rightfully possessed and enjoyed; it has become forfeited for mis-user or non-user – It is now well settled that a writ of quo warranto lies if any appointment to a public office is made in breach of the statute or the rules – In the case on hand, this Court is not concerned with the suitability of the respondent No. 4 – The “suitability” of a candidate for appointment to a post is to be judged by the appointing authority and not by the court unless the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules/provisions. [Paras 30, 84] |
