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Issues for consideration:In an appeal directed against the judgment passed by the HighCourt by which it allowed the writ petition filed by respondent andthereby set aside the order of penalty of withholding of 50% of hispension for all times to come, imposed upon the respondent inconnection with disciplinary proceedings initiated against him onallegations of a lady employee of sexual harassment at workplace,the following questions arose for consideration:-I. Whether the Central Complaints Committee constituted bythe Competent authority to inquire into the first complaintdated 30.08.2011 committed error in looking into the secondcomplaint dated 18.09.2012 containing additional allegationsagainst the respondent alongwith few other documentsincluding anonymous complaints made against the respondentin October 2011;II. Whether the Central Complaints Committee erred in assumingthe role of a prosecutor by putting questions to the witnessesin the course of departmental enquiry and thereby vitiatingthe disciplinary proceedings; andIII. Whether the Central Complaints Committee could be said tohave based its findings on mere conjectures and surmisesand the case on hand was one of “No Evidence”Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Standing Order No.1 of 2006 (Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To RedressGrievances of Women/Sexual Harassment at Work Place)– Clauses 9 and 10(i) – Sexual harassment at workplace –Lady employee lodged complaint against respondent andsubsequently submitted another (second) complaint containingadditional allegations against respondent along with few otherdocuments including anonymous complaints made againstthe respondent – Central Complaint Committee, constitutedto inquire into the first complaint, also looked into the secondcomplaint – High Court held that the Central ComplaintsCommittee was constituted by the competent authority to onlyinquire into the first complaint – Correctness of.Held: Irrespective of whether a prior complaint had already beenmade to any authority, a complaint regarding sexual harassmentcould be made under Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Orderto the complaints committee as-well – In the instant case, thesecond complaint had been promptly preferred right after theCentral Complaints Committee was constituted and duly beforeits first hearing – The High Court’s reasoning that as the CentralComplaints Committee was constituted on the basis of the firstcomplaint, its scope of inquiry was restricted to its content,is completely erroneous inasmuch as the Central ComplaintsCommittee owed its existence to the 2006 Standing Order and notto the complaint – Moreover, even if it is assumed for a momentthat the complaints committee owed its existence to the complaint,Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order envisages filing of acomplaint to the complaints committee i.e., it envisages a situationwhere after a complaints committee had come into existence, acomplaint may be preferred to it – In sensitive matters such assexual harassment & misconduct, there is an obligation to look intothe entire evidence of the complainant that inspires confidence –It would be quite preposterous to hold that the complainant wasprecluded from making the second complaint before the CentralComplaints Committee merely because she had already madeone complaint – In the context of the second complaint, the onlyrelevant aspect that required consideration was whether anyserious prejudice was caused to the respondent – On facts, noprejudice could be said to have been caused to the respondenteven if one believes that he was not asked to plead guilty to thesecond complaint – High Court mechanically proceeded to set-asidethe order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority onthe ground that there was nothing to indicate that the respondentwas asked whether he pleaded guilty to the charges imputed inthe second complaint without applying the principle of “test ofprejudice” [Paras 49, 50, 55, 56, 65 and 66]Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Standing Order No.1 of 2006 (Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To RedressGrievances of Women/Sexual Harassment at Work Place)– Clause 10(viii) – Sexual harassment at workplace – Ladyemployee lodged complaint – Disciplinary proceedingsconducted under Rule 14 of the 1965 CCS Rules – CentralComplaint Committee constituted by the Competent authorityto make inquiry had put questions to the witnesses ina departmental inquiry – Whether the same vitiated theinquiry proceedings – Service Law – Central Civil Services(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 – r.14 –Disciplinary proceedings – “Fact Finding” Authority.Held: It is the Inquiry Authority and the Disciplinary Authority whoare the fact finding authorities in a disciplinary proceeding – Aperusal of r.14 of the 1965 CCS Rules makes it clear that, where a‘Presenting Officer’ has been appointed by the Disciplinary Authority,such Officer shall present the case in support of the articles ofcharge. Conversely, what logically transpires from the aforesaid isthat, where no presenting officer has been appointed, the duty orrole to present the case in support of the articles of charge falls backon the Disciplinary Authority or the Inquiry Authority as the casemay be – The power and discretion of the complaints committee toput question to the witnesses is further reflected though implicitlyin Clause 10(viii) of the 2006 Standing Order – There appears tobe neither any statutory bar nor any logic to restrict the power ofthe complaints committee to put questions to the witnesses onlyto the context enumerated in the aforesaid provision – One fails tounderstand what other purpose the complaints committee which isdeemed to be an ‘inquiry authority’ would serve, if it is held that thecomplaints committee cannot put questions to the witnesses – Ifs.165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 permits a Judge to put questions tothe parties or to the witnesses in order to discover or obtain properproof of relevant facts and this provision being widely used by thejudges throughout the country, how the complaints committee afterbeing equated with a judge in a judicial proceeding can be deniedthat privilege – High Court was not correct in taking the view thatthe proceedings stood vitiated because the Central ComplaintsCommittee put questions to the prosecution witnesses. [Paras69,73,75, 77 and 78]Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Whether the CentralComplaints Committee based its findings on conjectures andsurmises – Whether the instant case is one of “no evidence”.Held: The evidence taken into consideration by the CentralComplaints Committee for arriving at the conclusion that the chargeswere held to be proved would indicate that this was not a case of“no evidence” – Some evidence has come on record to indicate orrather substantiate the allegations of sexual harassment levelled bythe complainant – The allegation related to the respondent makingunsolicited phone calls to the complainant, although no evidenceof the call recordings had been produced to substantiate thesame, was rightly accepted by the Central Complaints Committeekeeping in mind the background of the case – The findings of theCentral Complaints Committee could not be said to be based onconjectures and surmises – The Central Complaints Committedduly noted that the non-availability of the call records was owedto the fact that the inquiry into the complainant’s grievances wasundertaken after a lapse of significant time – Moreover, saidfinding is fortified by the oral evidence of one of the witnesseswho deposed that he was aware of the respondent making callsto the complainant. [Paras 94, 95, 96 and 97]Service Law – Disciplinary inquiry – Standard of Proof.Held: In a disciplinary inquiry, the standard of proof is preponderanceof probabilities – The courts must only interfere where the findingsare either perverse or based on no evidence at all. [Para 93]Service Law – Disciplinary proceedings – Scope of judicialreview.Held: It is well settled that when it comes to disciplinary proceedings,it is the inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority who couldbe said to be the fact-finding authority and the courts in exerciseof their powers of judicial review should not sit in appeal and re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own findings – The scopeof judicial review of the courts is limited only to the propriety of thedecision-making process and the fairness of the inquiry procedure.[Para 42]Doctrines / Principles – Principle of “Test of Prejudice” – InService Jurisprudence – Discussed. [Paras 57 and 58]Doctrines / Principles – Principle of “No Evidence” – In ServiceJurisprudence – Discussed. [Paras 79, 80, 86 and 89]Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Historical Background– Statutory Scheme – Discussed. [Paras 31-38]Crime against Women – Sexual harassment – Veracity andgenuineness of complaint should be scrutinised to preventmisuse – Duty of the courts.Held: Sexual harassment in any form at the work place must beviewed seriously – However, the charge of this nature is very easyto make and is very difficult to rebut – When a plea is taken offalse implication for extraneous reasons, the courts have a duty tomake deeper scrutiny of the evidence and decide the acceptabilityor otherwise of the accusations – The veracity and genuineness ofthe complaint should be scrutinised to prevent any misuse of suchlaudable laws enunciated for the upliftment of the society and forequal rights of people without gender discrimination by anybodyunder the garb of “sexual harassment”, lest justice rendering systemwould become a mockery. [Para 2] |
