NDLI: Revenue sharing among ISPs in two-sided markets

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Yuan Wu Hongseok Kim Hande, P.H. Mung Chiang Tsang, D.H.K.
Copyright Year	2011
Description	Author affiliation: Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, USA (Mung Chiang) \|\| Department of Electronic and Computer Engineering, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong (Yuan Wu; Tsang, D.H.K.) \|\| Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent, Murray Hill, NJ, USA (Hongseok Kim) \|\| Qualcomm Inc. NJ, USA (Hande, P.H.)
Abstract	In this paper, we study the revenue sharing and rate allocation for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that jointly provide network connectivity between content providers and end-users. Without colluding, each ISP may selfishly set a high transit-price to cover its cost and maximize its own profit, which inevitably results in a loss in social profit. We model this noncooperative interaction between an “eyeball” ISP and a “content” ISP as a Stackelberg game and quantify the resulting loss in social profit. To recover the profit loss, we propose a revenue sharing contract between ISPs by modeling them as a supply chain to deliver traffic in a two-sided market. Parameterized by the profit division factor, the sharing contract coordinates ISPs' objectives such that they aim to maximize the social profit self-incentively. We further propose a Nash bargaining process to determine the profit division factor such that all ISPs are simultaneously better off compared to the noncooperative equilibrium.
Starting Page	596
Ending Page	600
File Size	342454
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424499199
ISSN	0743166X
e-ISBN	9781424499212
DOI	10.1109/INFCOM.2011.5935234
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-04-10
Publisher Place	China
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Contracts Games Pricing Resource management NIST Elasticity Economics
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Science Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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