NDLI: To preempt or not: Tackling bid and time-based cheating in online spectrum auctions

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Deek, L. Xia Zhou Almeroth, K. Haitao Zheng
Copyright Year	2011
Description	Author affiliation: Department of Computer Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA (Deek, L.; Xia Zhou; Almeroth, K.; Haitao Zheng)
Abstract	Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder manipulation. Aside from rigging their bids, selfish bidders can falsely report their arrival time to game the system and obtain unfair advantage over others. Such time-based cheating is easy to perform yet produces severe damage to auction performance. We propose Topaz, a truthful online spectrum auction design that distributes spectrum efficiently while discouraging bidders from misreporting their bids or time report. Topaz makes three key contributions. First, Topaz applies a 3D bin packing mechanism to distribute spectrum across time, space and frequency, exploiting spatial and time reuse to improve allocation efficiency. Second, Topaz enforces truthfulness using a novel temporal-smoothed critical value based pricing. Capturing the temporal and spatial dependency among bidders who arrive subsequently, this pricing effectively diminishes gain from bid and/or time-cheating. Finally, Topaz offers a “scalable” winner preemption to address the uncertainty of future arrivals at each decision time, which significantly boosts auction revenue. We analytically prove Topaz's truthfulness, which does not require any knowledge of bidder behavior, or an optimal spectrum allocation to enforce truthfulness. Using empirical arrival and bidding models, we perform simulations to demonstrate the efficiency of Topaz. We show that proper winner preemption improves auction revenue by 45–65% at a minimum cost of spectrum utilization.
Starting Page	2219
Ending Page	2227
File Size	573733
Page Count	9
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424499199
ISSN	0743166X
e-ISBN	9781424499212
DOI	10.1109/INFCOM.2011.5935036
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-04-10
Publisher Place	China
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Resource management Pricing Resists Three dimensional displays Uncertainty Time frequency analysis Delay
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Science Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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