NDLI: Optimal bidding strategies for LSEs in single-bargainer electricity markets

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Ping Wang Xingying Chen Jun Xie Yingchen Liao Haoming Liu
Copyright Year	2008
Description	Author affiliation: Coll. of Electr. Eng., Hohai Univ., Nanjing (Ping Wang; Xingying Chen; Jun Xie; Yingchen Liao; Haoming Liu)
Abstract	The single-bargainer bidding model makes a new way for solving electricity prices rising when the market is lack of electricity supply. In the single-bargainer electricity markets, the profits of load serving entities (LSEs), to a certain extent, depend on their bidding strategies. In this paper, a methodological framework is proposed for developing optimal bidding strategies for LSEs participating in a single-bargainer electricity market in which sealed auction with step-wise quantity/price bidding functions and pay-as-bid settlement protocols are utilized. A normal distribution function is used to describe the bidding behaviors of rivals, and the problem of constructing optimal bidding strategies for distribution companies is then formulated as a stochastic optimization problem. The solution is based on the Monte-Carlo method. Finally, a single-bargainer electricity market with 4 LSEs is selected as an bench mark example to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Starting Page	510
Ending Page	514
File Size	474765
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9787900714138
DOI	10.1109/DRPT.2008.4523460
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2008-04-06
Publisher Place	China
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	DRPT
Subject Keyword	Electricity supply industry Protocols Game theory Probability distribution Stochastic processes Upper bound Energy management Relays Fuzzy sets Gaussian distribution stochastic optimization Bidding strategies electricity market single-bargainer Load Serving Entities (LSEs)
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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