NDLI: Analysis of supply function equilibrium in electricity markets with financial options contracts

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Wang Rui-qing Li Yu-zeng Zhang Shao-hua
Copyright Year	2008
Description	Author affiliation: Dept. of Autom., Shanghai Univ., Shanghai (Wang Rui-qing; Li Yu-zeng; Zhang Shao-hua)
Abstract	Bused on the peculiarities of bid-based-pool (BBP) electricity markets, the generators' gaming in financial options market and spot market is addressed. A two-period equilibrium model, where strategic generators compete with their rivals by supply function in spot market and by Cournot conjectures in financial options market, is presented. The model can be transformed to a set of nonlinear equations by gathering the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for all generators, and then be solved by an advanced Levenberg-Marquardt (L-M) algorithm. The results show that strategic generators will voluntarily participate in strategic financial options contracting, and thus their market power abuse can be mitigated and the competition in electricity markets can be enhanced to some extent. The effect of financial options contracts on electricity markets is stronger than forward contracts, and the market power abuse of generators with supply function competition can be mitigated to a larger extent than with Cournot.
Starting Page	247
Ending Page	251
File Size	479217
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9787900714138
DOI	10.1109/DRPT.2008.4523412
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2008-04-06
Publisher Place	China
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	DRPT
Subject Keyword	Electricity supply industry Power generation Forward contracts Risk management Nash equilibrium Marketing and sales Nonlinear equations Power system modeling Pricing Toy industry supply function electricity market financial options contract non-cooperative game
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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