NDLI: Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Diffo Lambo, L. Tchantcho, B. Moulen, J.
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	The Isbell desirability relation (I), the Shapley–Shubik index (SS) and the Banzhaf–Coleman index (BC) are power theories that grasp the notion of individual influence in a yes–no voting rule. Also, a yes–no voting rule is often used as a tool for aggregating individual preferences over any given finite set of alternatives into a collective preference. In this second context, Diffo Lambo and Moulen (DM) have introduced a power relation which ranks the voters with respect to how ably they influence the collective preference. However, DM relies on the metric d that measures closeness between preference relations. Our concern in this work is: do I, SS, BC and DM agree when the same yes–no voting rule is the basis for collective decision making? We provide a concrete and intuitive class of metrics called locally generated (LG). We give a characterization of the LG metrics d for which I, SS, BC and DM agree on ranking the voters.
Starting Page	719
Ending Page	731
Page Count	13
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	41
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2012-07-03
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Simple game Desirability relation Dominance Influence relation Power relation Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Organization/Planning Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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