NDLI: Social comparison, group composition, and incentive provision

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Brunner, Markus Sandner, Kai Jörg
Copyright Year	2011
Abstract	This article analyzes the optimal composition of groups of arbitrary size according to the social preferences of group members in a situation of moral hazard. We focus on rivalry, pure self-interest and altruism to show that in a situation where every group member compares his or her remuneration to the average remuneration of all members in the same group, ideally there should be as many extreme altruists as there are extreme rivals. If, by contrast, every member of the group compares his or her own remuneration to that of a focal agent, ideally, this focal agent should be a strong altruist, while all other group members should be highly competitive. Our results show that it is important to foster heterogeneity in the social preferences of the members of a group in order to maximize the profitability of the firm.
Starting Page	565
Ending Page	602
Page Count	38
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	41
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2011-10-05
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Group composition Rivalry Altruism Moral hazard Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Organization/Planning Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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