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  1. International Journal of Game Theory
  2. International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 26
  3. International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 26, Issue 3, October 1997
  4. Ternary voting games
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International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 46
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 45
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 44
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 43
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 42
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 41
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 40
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 39
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 38
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 37
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 36
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 35
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 34
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 33
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 32
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 31
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 30
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 29
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 28
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 27
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 26
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 26, Issue 4, December 1997
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 26, Issue 3, October 1997
Quasi-Cores in Bargaining sets
Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games
Finitely additive and epsilon Nash equilibria
Ternary voting games
A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game
On the complexity of testing membership in the core of min-cost spanning tree games
Minimum cost forest games
The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
Perfect information stochastic games and related classes
Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game
Pool — Listing service in game theory no. 44
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 26, Issue 2, June 1997
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 26, Issue 1, March 1997

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Ternary voting games

Content Provider Springer Nature Link
Author Felsenthal, Dan S. Machover, Moshé
Copyright Year 1997
Abstract We defineternary voting games (TVGs), a generalization ofsimple voting games (SVGs). In a play of an SVG each voter has just two options: voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In a TVG a third option is added: abstention. Every SVG can be regarded as a (somewhat degenerate) TVG; but the converse is false. We define appropriate generalizations of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for TVGs. We define also theresponsiveness (ordegree of democratic participation) of a TVG and determine, for eachn, the most responsive TVGs withn voters. We show that these maximally responsive TVGs are more responsive than the corresponding SVGs.
Starting Page 335
Ending Page 351
Page Count 17
File Format PDF
ISSN 00207276
Journal International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number 26
Issue Number 3
e-ISSN 14321270
Language English
Publisher Physica-Verlag
Publisher Date 1997-01-01
Publisher Place Heidelberg
Access Restriction One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Economic Theory Operation Research/Decision Theory Organization/Planning
Content Type Text
Resource Type Article
Subject Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
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