NDLI: The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Sotomayor, Marilda
Copyright Year	2008
Abstract	A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students’ strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.
Starting Page	621
Ending Page	640
Page Count	20
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	36
Issue Number	3-4
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2008-01-29
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Stable matching Nash equilibrium Mechanism Stablematching rule Random stable matching rule Organization/Planning Operations Research/Decision Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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