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  1. International Journal of Game Theory
  2. International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 36
  3. International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 36, Issue 3-4, March 2008
  4. Core-selecting package auctions
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International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 46
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 45
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 44
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 43
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 42
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 41
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 40
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 39
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 38
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 37
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 36
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 36, Issue 3-4, March 2008
A collection of papers dedicated to David Gale on the occasion of his 85th birthday
Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?
The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
Proportional pie-cutting
Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
Core-selecting package auctions
Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games
Random paths to P-stability in the roommate problem
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity
Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 36, Issue 2, October 2007
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 36, Issue 1, September 2007
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 35
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 34
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 33
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 32
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 31
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 30
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 29
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 28
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 27
International Journal of Game Theory : Volume 26

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Core-selecting package auctions

Content Provider Springer Nature Link
Author Day, Robert Milgrom, Paul
Copyright Year 2007
Abstract Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among core-selecting auctions, the ones that minimize seller revenues also maximize incentives for truthful reporting, produce the Vickrey outcome when that lies in the core and, in contrast to the Vickrey auction, and create no incentive for a seller to exclude qualified bidders. Core-selecting auctions are related to and share properties with stable matching mechanisms.
Starting Page 393
Ending Page 407
Page Count 15
File Format PDF
ISSN 00207276
Journal International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number 36
Issue Number 3-4
e-ISSN 14321270
Language English
Publisher Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date 2007-07-06
Publisher Place Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword Core Stable matching Marriage problem Auctions Core-selecting auctions Menu auctions Proxy auctions Package bidding Combinatorial bidding Incentives Truncation strategies Organization/Planning Operations Research/Decision Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Economic Theory
Content Type Text
Resource Type Article
Subject Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
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