NDLI: Loss of skills in coordination games

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Flesch, J. Schoenmakers, G. Vrieze, O. J.
Copyright Year	2011
Abstract	This paper deals with 2-player coordination games with vanishing actions, which are repeated games where all diagonal payoffs are strictly positive and all non-diagonal payoffs are zero with the following additional property: At any stage beyond r, if a player has not played a certain action for the last r stages, then he unlearns this action and it disappears from his action set. Such a game is called an r-restricted game. To evaluate the stream of payoffs we use the average reward. For r = 1 the game strategically reduces to a one-shot game and for r ≥ 3 in Schoenmakers (Int Game Theory Rev 4:119–126, 2002) it is shown that all payoffs in the convex hull of the diagonal payoffs are equilibrium rewards. In this paper for the case r = 2 we provide a characterization of the set of equilibrium rewards for 2 × 2 games of this type and a technique to find the equilibrium rewards in m × m games. We also discuss subgame perfection.
Starting Page	769
Ending Page	789
Page Count	21
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	40
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2011-02-04
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Game theory Repeated games Coordination games Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Operations Research/Decision Theory Organization/Planning Economic Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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