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Rentabilidad De Corto Plazo versus Rentabilidad De Largo Plazo: ¿cómo Funcionan Los Incentivos De Gestión De Las Afap?
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Sarmiento, Adolfo |
| Copyright Year | 2002 |
| Abstract | This paper analizes the set of incentives designed to guide pension funds managers investment decisions, and its consequences on the allocation and performance of pension funds portfolios. A principal-agent relationship model is explored to show the difficulties involved in achieving solutions that would prove optimal for the principal interests and the need of regulatory intervention. Three mechanisms are used in most countries: the rate of return band, the special reserve fund and the possibility for any account holder to transfer his/her account to another pension fund manager. The latter proves to be the most relevant: The threat of loosing business to another administrator, induces managers to look for better returns in the short run. Counter to the intuition that pension funds must be invested in long maturity projects, this mechanism is responsible for the investment of at least part of the funds in liquid assets. In the presence of imperfect information within markets that need specialized expertise, this study also highlights the role of regulators in ensuring the access of individuals to quality information, setting reasonable limits on the exposure to risk of pension funds portfolios and controlling the operations of the funds’ managers. |
| Starting Page | 161 |
| Ending Page | 167 |
| Page Count | 7 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Volume Number | 9 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.bvrie.gub.uy/local/File/JAE/2002/iees03j130702.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Comunicaciones/Jornadas%20de%20Economa/iees03j130702.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |