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Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and R&D Subsidy Policy
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Fan, Cuihong Wolfstetter, Elmar |
| Copyright Year | 2008 |
| Abstract | We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the subsequent oligopoly game. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms in order to raise their bargaining position in the joint venture. This holds true regardless of whether governments offer either unconditional or conditional subsidies. This suggests an alternative explanation of the observed proliferation of R&D subsidies. |
| Starting Page | 1 |
| Ending Page | 19 |
| Page Count | 19 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.927739 |
| Volume Number | 8 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://sfbtr15.de/uploads/media/165.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13386/1/165.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/93775/1/sfb-tr15-dp165.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1432&context=bejte |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.927739 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |