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Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Cassiman, Bruno |
| Copyright Year | 2000 |
| Abstract | When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an important instrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. The regulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there exist appropriability problems between the firms is one such variable that is private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policy where the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sum subsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy without subsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow some welfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policy trades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasing RJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones. |
| Starting Page | 283 |
| Ending Page | 314 |
| Page Count | 32 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00013-7 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://repositori.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/701/263.pdf;jsessionid=99B2AA3276850E08A03736A77766E4AE?sequence=1 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/17490.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.pws.stu.edu.tw/chenss/doc/Industrial_organization/Research%20joint%20ventures%20and%20optimal%20R&D%20policy%20with.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187%2898%2900013-7 |
| Volume Number | 18 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Notice |
