Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Fan, Cuihong Wolfstetter, Elmar G. |
| Copyright Year | 2008 |
| Abstract | We reconsider the justifications of the R&D subsidies of Spencer and Brander (1983), by allowing firms to form a research joint venture (RJV) and license innovations. If governments offer unconditional subsidies, an RJV is formed and the strategic benefits of R&D subsidies vanish. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms to enhance their bargaining position in the joint venture subgame. If governments offer subsidies conditional on forming resp. not forming an RJV, the game has multiple equilibria: one that restores the Spencer and Brander result, and another in which governments induce the formation of an RJV by a combination of conditional taxes and subsidies. |
| Related Links | https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13386/1/165.pdf |
| ISSN | 21946124 |
| e-ISSN | 19351704 |
| DOI | 10.2202/1935-1704.1432 |
| Journal | The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics |
| Issue Number | 1 |
| Volume Number | 8 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH |
| Publisher Date | 2008-09-03 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | The B.e. Journal of Theoretical Economics Economics Bargaining Optimal License Joint Venture R&d Subsidies Rjv Journal: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Issue- 4 |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
