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A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Erdil, Aytek Klemperer, Paul D. |
| Copyright Year | 2010 |
| Abstract | We propose a new, easy-to-implement class of payment rules, "Reference Rules" to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost-riskless, profitable deviations from "truthful bidding" are often easy for bidders to find under currently used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules. (JEL: D44, C71) (c) 2010 by the European Economic Association. |
| Starting Page | 537 |
| Ending Page | 547 |
| Page Count | 11 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00524.x |
| Volume Number | 8 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2009/w11/cspa-23-9-2009.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2009/w11/cspa-23-9-2009.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/cspa-23-9-2009.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00524.x |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
