Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
Core-selecting secondary spectrum auctions.
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Zhu, Yuefei Li, Baochun Fu, Haoming Li, Zongpeng |
| Abstract | Abstract—In a secondary spectrum market, the utility of a secondary user often depends on not only whether it wins, but also which channels it wins. Combinatorial auctions are a natural fit here to allow secondary users to bid for combinations of channels. In this context, the VCG mechanism constitutes a generic auction that uniquely guarantees both truthfulness and efficiency. There also exists related auction design that relaxes efficiency due to perceived complexity issues, and focuses on truthfulness. Starting with new empirical evidences on the com-plexity issue, we propose to design core-selecting auctions instead, which resolve VCG’s vulnerability to collusion and shill bidding, and improve seller revenue. While the VCG type of auctions are unique in guaranteeing both efficiency and truthfulness, we prove that our core-selecting auctions are unique in guaranteeing both efficiency and shill-proofness, and always outperform VCG auctions in terms of seller revenue generated. Employing linear programming and quadratic programming techniques, we design two payment rules for minimizing the incentives of bidders to deviate from truth telling. |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Core-selecting Secondary Spectrum Auction Secondary User Core-selecting Auction Seller Revenue Com-plexity Issue Generic Auction Natural Fit Shill Bidding Quadratic Programming Technique Linear Programming New Empirical Evidence Vcg Type Combinatorial Auction Vcg Auction Secondary Spectrum Market Truth Telling Vcg Mechanism Payment Rule Related Auction Design Perceived Complexity Issue |
| Content Type | Text |
