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Managerial Delegation Contracts, “Green” R&D and Emissions Taxation
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna Yong, Soo Keong |
| Copyright Year | 2018 |
| Abstract | We introduce an explicit environmental incentive into a managerial compensation contract in the context of a Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities under an emissions tax regime. We show that, depending on the effectiveness of “green” R&D, compared to a standard sales compensation contract, the explicit environmental focused contract results in more abatement. As a consequence, the regulator sets a lower emissions tax, and social welfare is higher. Moreover, in general, firm owners earn higher profits when adopting the environmental delegation contract. |
| Related Links | http://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/bejte.ahead-of-print/bejte-2017-0128/bejte-2017-0128.xml |
| ISSN | 21946124 |
| e-ISSN | 19351704 |
| DOI | 10.1515/bejte-2017-0128 |
| Journal | The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics |
| Issue Number | 2 |
| Volume Number | 19 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH |
| Publisher Date | 2018-12-11 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | The B.e. Journal of Theoretical Economics Finance Abatement Emissions Tax Cournot Duopoly Managerial Delegation “green” R&d Journal: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Issue- 4 |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Economics, Econometrics and Finance |