NDLI: Toward a VCG-Like Approximate Mechanism for Large-Scale Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Fukuta, N.
Copyright Year	2011
Abstract	Multi-unit combinatorial auction is a combinatorial auction that has some items that can bee seen as indistinguishable. Although the mechanism can be applied for dynamic electricity auctions and various purposes, it is difficult to be applied for large-scale auction problems due to its computational intractability. In this paper, I introduce a mechanism that employs an approximate allocation and pricing algorithm that is capable to handle multi-unit auctions. The algorithm effectively produce approximation allocations that are necessary in pricing and it behaves as an approximation of VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism satisfying budget balance condition and bidders' individual rationality without having single-minded bidders assumption. I show that the proposed allocation algorithm successfully produced good allocations for the problems that cannot be easily solved by ordinary LP solvers due to hard time constraints.
Starting Page	317
Ending Page	322
File Size	349465
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781457713736
DOI	10.1109/WI-IAT.2011.191
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-08-22
Publisher Place	France
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Algorithm design and analysis Cats Pricing approximation algorithm Approximation algorithms mechanism design Resource management Approximation methods auctions Sorting
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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