NDLI: A stackelberg game for pricing uplink power in wide-band cognitive radio networks

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Al Daoud, A. Alpcan, T. Agarwal, S. Alanyali, M.
Copyright Year	2008
Description	Author affiliation: Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Boston Univ., Boston, MA, USA (Al Daoud, A.; Alanyali, M.) \|\| Deutsche Telekom Labs., Tech. Univ. Berlin, Berlin, Germany (Alpcan, T.; Agarwal, S.)
Abstract	We study the problem of pricing uplink power in wide-band cognitive radio networks under the objective of revenue maximization for the service provider and while ensuring incentive compatibility for the users. User utility is modeled as a concave function of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the base station, and the problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. Namely, the service provider imposes differentiated prices per unit of transmitting power and the users consequently update their power levels to maximize their net utilities. We devise a pricing policy and give conditions for its optimality when all the users are to be accommodated in the network. We show that there exist infinitely many Nash equilibrium points that reward the service provider with the same revenue. The pricing policy charges more from users that have better channel conditions and more willingness to pay for the provided service. We then study properties of the optimal revenue with respect to different parameters in the network. We show that for regimes with symmetric users who share the same level of willingness to pay, the optimal revenue is concave and increasing in the number of users in the network. We analytically obtain achievable SNRs for this special case, and finally present a numerical study in support of our results.
Starting Page	1422
Ending Page	1427
File Size	384544
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424431236
ISSN	01912216
DOI	10.1109/CDC.2008.4738975
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2008-12-09
Publisher Place	Mexico
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Pricing Wideband Cognitive radio Resource management Communication networks Game theory Radio control Signal to noise ratio Base stations Nash equilibrium
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in