NDLI: Analysis of Price of Anarchy in Traffic Networks With Heterogeneous Price-Sensitivity Populations

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Xuehe Wang Nan Xiao Lihua Xie Frazzoli, E. Rus, D.
Copyright Year	1993
Abstract	In this paper, we investigate how the scaled marginal-cost road pricing improves the price of anarchy (POA) in a traffic network with one origin-destination pair, where each edge in the network is associated with a latency function. The POA is defined as the worst possible ratio between the total latency of Nash flow and that of the socially optimal flow. All players in the noncooperative congestion game are divided into groups based on their price sensitivities. First, we consider the case where all players are partitioned into two groups in a network with two routes. In this case, it is shown that the total latency of the Nash flow can always reach the total latency of the socially optimal flow if the designed road price is charged on each link. We then analyze the POA for general case. For a distribution of price sensitivities satisfying certain conditions, a road pricing scheme is designed such that the unique Nash flow can achieve the social optimal flow, i.e., $\text {POA}=1$ . An algorithm is proposed to find the price scheme that optimizes the POA for any distribution of price sensitivities and any traffic network with one origin-destination pair. Finally, the results are applied to a traffic routing problem.
Sponsorship	IEEE Control Systems Society
Starting Page	2227
Ending Page	2237
Page Count	11
File Size	2374488
File Format	PDF
ISSN	10636536
Volume Number	23
Issue Number	6
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2015-01-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Pricing Sensitivity Games Nash equilibrium Routing Traffic control traffic networks. Noncooperative congestion game price of anarchy (POA) price sensitivity road pricing traffic networks
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Control and Systems Engineering Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
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