NDLI: Congestion-Dependent Pricing and Forward Contracts for Complementary Segments of a Communication Network

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Reiter, M. Steinberg, R.
Copyright Year	1993
Abstract	Congestion-dependent pricing is a form of traffic management that ensures the efficient allocation of bandwidth between users and applications. As the unpredictability of congestion prices creates revenue uncertainty for network providers and cost uncertainty for users, it has been suggested that forward contracts could be used to manage these risks. We develop a novel game-theoretic model of a multiprovider communication network with two complementary segments and investigate whether forward contracts would be adopted by service providers. Service on the upstream segment is provided by a single Internet service provider (ISP) and priced dynamically to maximize profit, while several smaller ISPs sell connectivity on the downstream network segment, with the advance possibility of entering into forward contracts with their users for some of their capacity. We show that the equilibrium forward contracting volumes are necessarily asymmetric, with one downstream provider entering into fewer forward contracts than the other competitors, thus ensuring a high subsequent downstream price level. In practice, network providers will choose the extent of forward contracting strategically based not only on their risk tolerance, but also on the market structure in the interprovider network and their peers' actions.
Sponsorship	IEEE Computer Society IEEE Communications Society Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Starting Page	436
Ending Page	449
Page Count	14
File Size	433631
File Format	PDF
ISSN	10636692
Volume Number	20
Issue Number	2
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2012-04-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Pricing Bandwidth Forward contracts Games Internet Nash equilibrium traffic control (communication) Communication system traffic communication systems contracts economics game theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Networks and Communications Electrical and Electronic Engineering Computer Science Applications Software

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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