NDLI: Inter-Session Network Coding with Strategic Users: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Butterfly Network

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Mohsenian-Rad, H. Jianwei Huang Wong, V.W.S. Jaggi, S. Schober, R.
Copyright Year	1972
Abstract	We analyze inter-session network coding in a wired network using game theory. We assume that users are selfish and act as strategic players to maximize their own utility, which leads to a resource allocation game among users. In particular, we study a butterfly network, where a bottleneck link is shared by network coding and routing flows. We assume that network coding is performed using pairwise XOR operations. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for a wide range of utility functions. We also show that the number of Nash equilibria can be large (even infinite) for certain choices of parameters. This is in sharp contrast to a similar game setting with traditional packet forwarding, where the Nash equilibrium is always unique. We characterize the worst-case efficiency bound, i.e., the Price-of-Anarchy (PoA), compared to an optimal and cooperative network design. We show that by using a discriminatory pricing scheme which charges encoded and forwarded packets differently, we can improve the PoA in comparison with the case where a single pricing scheme is used. However, even when a discriminatory pricing scheme is used, the PoA is still worse than for the case when network coding is not applied. This implies that, although inter-session network coding can improve performance compared to routing, it is much more sensitive to users' strategic behavior.
Starting Page	1473
Ending Page	1484
Page Count	12
File Size	898235
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00906778
Volume Number	61
Issue Number	4
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2013-04-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Games Network coding Nash equilibrium Routing Pricing Resource management Cost function efficiency bound Inter-session network coding butterfly network game theory price-of-anarchy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Repeated Inter-Session Network Coding Games with an Average Cost Share Pricing Mechanism in Congested Networks

The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks

On the Network Sharing of Mixed Network Coding and Routing Data Flows in Congestion Networks

Generalized Efficiency Bounds in Distributed Resource Allocation

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Stable Routing in Max-Min Fair Networks

Repeated Intersession Network Coding Games: Efficiency and Min-Max Bargaining Solution

The Price of Selfishness in Network Coding

Analysis of Price of Anarchy in Traffic Networks With Heterogeneous Price-Sensitivity Populations

Price of Anarchy for Congestion Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

Inter-Session Network Coding with Strategic Users: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Butterfly Network

Similar Documents

Repeated Inter-Session Network Coding Games with an Average Cost Share Pricing Mechanism in Congested Networks

The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks

On the Network Sharing of Mixed Network Coding and Routing Data Flows in Congestion Networks

Generalized Efficiency Bounds in Distributed Resource Allocation

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Stable Routing in Max-Min Fair Networks

Repeated Intersession Network Coding Games: Efficiency and Min-Max Bargaining Solution

The Price of Selfishness in Network Coding

Analysis of Price of Anarchy in Traffic Networks With Heterogeneous Price-Sensitivity Populations

Price of Anarchy for Congestion Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

Inter-Session Network Coding with Strategic Users: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Butterfly Network