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Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.118, 138, 139 – Complainant-appellant case was that respondent had borrowed rupees two lakhs from him – Against the said loan the respondent issued a cheque, as a guarantee against repayment – Since the respondent failed to repay the loan despite repeated requests, the appellant presented the concerned cheque for encashment, as per the Bank Memo, the cheque was dishonoured on account of “insufficient funds” – A demand notice sent by the appellant – In reply to the demand notice, the respondent claimed that the accusations made by the appellant were false – Appellant filed a complaint case – The Trial Court adjudicated in favour of the respondent – The decision was affirmed by the High Court – Interference required or not: Held: Applying the settled legal position to the present factual matrix, it is apparent that there existed a contradiction in the complaint moved by the appellant as against his cross-examination relatable to the time of presentation of the cheque by the respondent as per the statements of the appellant – This is to the effect that while the appellant claimed the cheque to have been issued at the time of advancing of the loan as a security, however, as per his statement during the cross-examination it was revealed that the same was presented when an alleged demand for repayment of alleged loan amount was raised before the respondent, after a period of six months of advancement – Furthermore, there was no financial capacity or acknowledgement in his Income Tax Returns by the appellant to the effect of having advanced a loan to the respondent – Even further the appellant has not been able to showcase as to when the said loan was advanced in favour of the respondent nor has he been able to explain as to how a cheque issued by the respondent allegedly in favour of one M landed in the hands of the instant holder, that is, the appellant – The Trial Court had rightly observed that the appellant was not able to plead even a valid existence of a legally recoverable debt as the very issuance of cheque is dubious based on the fallacies and contradictions in the evidence adduced by the parties – Furthermore, the fact that the respondent had inscribed his signature on the agreement drawn on a white paper and not on a stamp paper as presented by the appellant, creates another set of doubt in the case – Since the accused has been able to cast a shadow of doubt on the case presented by the appellant, he has therefore successfully rebutted the presumption stipulated by Section 139 of the NI Act 1881 – The instant case pertains to challenge against concurrent findings of fact favouring the acquittal of the respondent, it is settled that this Court would ordinarily not interfere with such view considering the principle of liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, unless perversity is blatantly forthcoming and there are compelling reasons – Thus, the present challenge to the aforesaid impugned judgment dated 03.03.2023 by the High Court is bereft of any merits and does not call for any interference. [Paras 27, 29, 31(ii), 33] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Three essential conditions for invoking proceedings u/s.138: Held: The NI Act 1881 enlists three essential conditions that ought to be fulfilled before the said provision of law can be invoked – Firstly, the cheque ought to have been presented within the period of its validity – Secondly, a demand of payment ought to have been made by the presenter of the cheque to the issuer, and lastly, the drawer ought to have had failed to pay the amount within a period of 15 days of the receipt of the demand. [Para 14] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Period of limitation: Held: While referring to the period of limitation of one month of filing a complaint for the purpose of Section 138 of the NI Act 1881, the same is to begin after the drawer of the cheque has failed to discharge his liability to the presenter within the prescribed period of 15 days as per the Proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act 1881 – A conjoint reading of Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act 1881 makes it clear that the cause of action only arises after the failure of the drawer to pay, subsequent to the receipt of the notice, and the complainant is restricted from initiating multiple complaints against the concerned drawer at different stages contemplated prior. [Para 16]Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s. 143 – Summary Trial – Attendance of accused – Non-bailable warrant: Held: In light of such object encapsulated in the Amendment to Chapter VIII, the Parliament by virtue of Section 143 of the NI Act 1881 prescribed procedure of summary trial enlisted in provisions of Sections 260 to 265 of the CrPC 1973 to be adopted during proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act 1881 – Therefore, it can be observed that the court shall adopt a liberal approach with regard to attendance of an accused person and until an accused’s presence is indispensable, a court can allow for an exemption, in case of existence of any exceptional circumstances – Moreover, issuance of a non-bailable warrant in case of absence of the accused, at the first instance, shall, due to any circumstance, be avoided. [Para 17]Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.139 – Presumption in favour of holder: Held: The aforesaid presumption entails an obligation on the court conducting the trial for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act 1881 to presume that the cheque in question was issued by the drawer or accused for the discharge of a particular liability – The use of expression “shall presume” ameliorates the conundrum pertaining to the right of the accused to present evidence for the purpose of rebutting the said presumption – Furthermore, the effect of such presumption is that, upon filing of the complaint along with relevant documents, thereby prima facie establishing the case against the drawer, the onus of proof shifts on the drawer or accused to adduce cogent material and evidence for rebutting the said presumption, and as established in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat and others, based on preponderance of probabilities. [Para 19] Jurisprudence – Criminal Jurisprudence – Essence of liberty – Presumption of innocence: Held: Criminal jurisprudence emphasises on the fundamental essence of liberty and presumption of innocence unless proven guilty – This presumption gets emboldened by virtue of concurrent findings of acquittal – Therefore, this court must be extra cautious while dealing with a challenge against acquittal as the said presumption gets reinforced by virtue of a well-reasoned favourable outcome – Consequently, the onus on the prosecution side becomes more burdensome pursuant to the said double presumption. [Para 31(i)]Criminal Law – Where two views are possible – Concurrent findings of acquittal: Held: Where two views are possible, then this Court would not ordinarily interfere and reverse the concurrent findings of acquittal – However, where the situation is such that the only conclusion which could be arrived at from a comprehensive appraisal of evidence, shows that there has been a grave miscarriage of justice, then, notwithstanding such concurrent view, this Court would not restrict itself to adopt an oppugnant view. [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dan Singh]. [Para 31(iii)]Criminal Law – Concurrent findings favoring accused – When interference required: Held: In situations of concurrent findings favoring accused, interference is required where the trial court adopted an incorrect approach in framing of an issue of fact and the appellate court whilst affirming the view of the trial court, lacked in appreciating the evidence produced by the accused in rebutting a legal presumption. [Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh] – Furthermore, such interference is necessitated to safeguard interests of justice when the acquittal is based on some irrelevant grounds or fallacies in re-appreciation of any fundamental evidentiary material or a manifest error of law or in cases of non-adherence to the principles of natural justice or the decision is manifestly unjust or where an acquittal which is fundamentally based on an exaggerated adherence to the principle of granting benefit of doubt to the accused, is liable to be set aside – Say in cases where the court severed the connection between accused and criminality committed by him upon a cursory examination of evidences. [State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh and Others and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar]. [Para 31 (v)(vi)] |
