NDLI: Distinguishing Between Three Versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect Hypothesis in Moral Psychology

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Fitzpatrick, Simon
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	Based on the results of empirical studies of folk moral judgment, several researchers have claimed that something like the famous Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) may be a fundamental, albeit unconscious, component of human moral psychology. Proponents of this psychological DDE hypothesis have, however, said surprisingly little about how the distinction at the heart of standard formulations of the principle—the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences—might be cognised when we make moral judgments about people’s actions. I first highlight the problem of precisely formulating the distinction between intended and foreseen consequences and its implications for interpreting the empirical data on folk moral judgment. I then distinguish between three different approaches to this problem that have been taken by proponents of the DDE in normative ethics: so-called “closeness” accounts, accounts that employ what has come to be known as a “strict” notion of intention, and Warren Quinn’s recasting of the DDE in terms of the distinction between “direct” and “indirect agency”. I show that when taken as claims about moral psychology, these different accounts entail quite different empirical predictions about what people’s moral judgments should be in particular cases. Based on the current empirical data, I argue that a version of Quinn’s formulation of the DDE is the most empirically plausible, and that adopting such a formulation helps to diffuse much (though not all) of the recent empirical criticism of the DDE hypothesis.
Starting Page	505
Ending Page	525
Page Count	21
File Format	PDF
ISSN	18785158
Journal	Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume Number	5
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	18785166
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2014-06-27
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Philosophy of Mind Cognitive Psychology Neurosciences Epistemology Developmental Psychology Philosophy of Science
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis

In the Thick of Moral Motivation

The Moral Cognition/Consciousness Connection

Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas

Revisiting Folk Moral Realism

The Two Sources of Moral Standing

Breaking Out of Moral Typecasting

Dissolving the Puzzle of Resultant Moral Luck

Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence

Distinguishing Between Three Versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect Hypothesis in Moral Psychology

Similar Documents

Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis

In the Thick of Moral Motivation

The Moral Cognition/Consciousness Connection

Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas

Revisiting Folk Moral Realism

The Two Sources of Moral Standing

Breaking Out of Moral Typecasting

Dissolving the Puzzle of Resultant Moral Luck

Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence

Distinguishing Between Three Versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect Hypothesis in Moral Psychology