NDLI: The impact of available information on negotiation results

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Azoulay Schwartz, Rina Dor Shiffer, Daphna
Copyright Year	2011
Abstract	Negotiation is the most famous tool for reaching an agreement between parties. Usually, the different parties can be modeled as a buyer and a seller, who negotiate about the price of a given item. In most cases, the parties have incomplete information about one another, but they can invest money and efforts in order to acquire information about each other. This leads to the question of how much each party will be willing to invest on information about its opponent, prior to the negotiation process. In this paper, we consider the profitability of automated negotiators acquiring information on their opponents. In our model, a buyer and a seller negotiate on the price of a given item. Time is costly, and incomplete information exists about the reservation price of both parties. The reservation price of the buyer is the maximum price it is willing to pay for an item or service, and the reservation price of the seller is the minimum price it is willing to receive in order to sell the item or service. Our research is based on Cramton’s symmetrical protocol of negotiation that provides the agents with stable and symmetric strategies, and involves a delay in proposing an offer for signaling. The parties in Cramton’s model delay their offers in order to signal their strength, and then an agreement is reached after one or two offers. We determine the Nash equilibrium for agents that prefer to purchase information. Then, in addition to the theoretical background, we used simulations to check which type of equilibrium will actually be obtained. We found that in most of the cases, each agent will prefer to purchase information only if its opponent does. The reason for these results lies in the fact that an agent that prefers to purchase information according to a one-side method, signals its weakness and thereby reduces its position in the negotiation. Our results demonstrate the efficiency of joint information acquisition by both agents, but they also show that one-sided information purchasing may be inefficient, if the acquisition activity is revealed by the opponent, which causes it to infer that the informed agent is relatively weak.
Ending Page	340
Page Count	30
Starting Page	311
File Format	PDF
ISSN	10122443
e-ISSN	15737470
Journal	Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Issue Number	3-4
Volume Number	60
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2011-06-11
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Games of timing 2-person games Computer Science Rationality, learning Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics) Signaling, communication Mathematics Electronic commerce Bilateral negotiation Value of information Signalling Statistical Physics, Dynamical Systems and Complexity
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Applied Mathematics Artificial Intelligence

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

A formal analysis of interest-based negotiation

Bargaining over multiple issues in finite horizon alternating-offers protocol

Proof systems and transformation games

On the computational complexity of weighted voting games

Methods for approximating value functions for the Dominion card game

Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings

A multi-agent based model for collective purchasing in electronic commerce

Exploring the boundary of half-positionality

Special issue on learning and intelligent optimization

The impact of available information on negotiation results

Similar Documents

A formal analysis of interest-based negotiation

Bargaining over multiple issues in finite horizon alternating-offers protocol

Proof systems and transformation games

On the computational complexity of weighted voting games

Methods for approximating value functions for the Dominion card game

Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings

A multi-agent based model for collective purchasing in electronic commerce

Exploring the boundary of half-positionality

Special issue on learning and intelligent optimization

The impact of available information on negotiation results