NDLI: Proof systems and transformation games

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. Bachrach, Yoram Wooldridge, Michael Zuckerman, Michael
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	We introduce Transformation Games (TGs), a form of coalitional game in which players are endowed with sets of initial resources, and have capabilities allowing them to derive certain output resources, given certain input resources. The aim of a TG is to generate a particular target resource; players achieve this by forming a coalition capable of performing a sequence of transformations from a combined set of initial resources to the target resource. TGs can model a number of natural settings, such as cooperative proof systems, where a collection of agents having different expertise work together to derive a proof for a target theorem, or supply chains, where agents cooperate to create a target product from base resources. After presenting the TG model, and discussing its interpretation, we consider possible restrictions on the transformation chain, resulting in different coalitional games. Following the basic model, we consider the computational complexity of several problems in TGs, such as testing whether a coalition wins, checking if a player is a dummy or a veto player, computing the core of the game, computing power indices, and checking the effects of possible restrictions on the coalition. Finally, we consider extensions to the model in which transformations have associated costs.
Ending Page	30
Page Count	30
Starting Page	1
File Format	PDF
ISSN	10122443
e-ISSN	15737470
Journal	Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Issue Number	1
Volume Number	67
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2012-11-16
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity Supply chains Computer Science Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics) The Shapley value Power indices Mathematics The core Statistical Physics, Dynamical Systems and Complexity Cooperative games Cooperative game theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Applied Mathematics Artificial Intelligence

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

On the computational complexity of weighted voting games

Derivative of functions over lattices as a basis for the notion of interaction between attributes

Toward the complexity of the existence of wonderfully stable partitions and strictly core stable coalition structures in enemy-oriented hedonic games

Incomplete cooperative games with player-centered information

Cooperative Game Theory: Basic Concepts and Computational Challenges

Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis

Computation of the Shapley value of minimum cost spanning tree games: #P-hardness and polynomial cases

Methods for approximating value functions for the Dominion card game

Taxed congestion games with failures

Proof systems and transformation games

Similar Documents

On the computational complexity of weighted voting games

Derivative of functions over lattices as a basis for the notion of interaction between attributes

Toward the complexity of the existence of wonderfully stable partitions and strictly core stable coalition structures in enemy-oriented hedonic games

Incomplete cooperative games with player-centered information

Cooperative Game Theory: Basic Concepts and Computational Challenges

Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis

Computation of the Shapley value of minimum cost spanning tree games: #P-hardness and polynomial cases

Methods for approximating value functions for the Dominion card game

Taxed congestion games with failures

Proof systems and transformation games