NDLI: Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Bade, Sophie
Copyright Year	2016
Abstract	Is the Pareto optimality of matching mechanisms robust to the introduction of boundedly rational behavior? To address this question I define a restrictive and a permissive notion of Pareto optimality and consider the large set of hierarchical exchange mechanisms which contains serial dictatorship as well as Gale’s top trading cycles. Fix a housing problem with boundedly rational agents and a hierarchical exchange mechanism. Consider the set of matchings that arise with all possible assignments of agents to initial endowments in the given mechanism. I show that this set is nested between the sets of Pareto optima according to the restrictive and the permissive notion. These containment relations are generally strict, even when deviations from rationality are minimal. In a similar vein, minimal deviations from rationality suffice for the set of outcomes of Gale’s top trading cycles with all possible initial endowments to differ from the set of outcomes of serial dictatorship with all possible orders of agents as dictators.
Ending Page	510
Page Count	10
Starting Page	501
File Format	PDF
ISSN	01761714
e-ISSN	1432217X
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Issue Number	3
Volume Number	47
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2016-07-02
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Political Economy Public Finance Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics

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