NDLI: Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Kazumura, Tomoya Serizawa, Shigehiro
Copyright Year	2016
Abstract	We consider the problem of allocating sets of objects to agents and collecting payments. Each agent has a preference relation over the set of pairs consisting of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where the wealth effect is non-negligible: the payment level changes agents’ willingness to pay for swapping sets. We investigate the existence of efficient and strategy-proof rules. A preference relation is unit-demand if given a payment level, for each set of objects, the most preferred one in the set is at least as good as the set itself; it is multi-demand if given a payment level, when an agent receives an object, receiving some additional object(s) makes him better off. We show that if a domain contains enough variety of unit-demand preferences and at least one multi-demand preference relation, and if there are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers on the domain.
Starting Page	633
Ending Page	663
Page Count	31
File Format	PDF
ISSN	01761714
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume Number	47
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	1432217X
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2016-09-21
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Strategy-proofness Efficiency Multi-demand preferences Unit-demand preferences Non-quasi-linear preferences Minimum price Walrasian rule Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Public Finance Political Economy Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics

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