NDLI: Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Sertel, Murat R. Sanver, M. Remzi
Copyright Year	2004
Abstract	We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class of such social choice functions is quite broad, including every “t-refinement” of the Plurality Rule, Plurality with a Runoff, the Majoritarian Compromise and the Single Transferable Vote, i.e., any selection from either of these social choice rules which is obtained via tie-breaking among candidates according to any total order t on the set of alternatives. As announced in our title, the strong equilibrium outcomes of the voting games determined by such social choice functions turn out to be nothing but generalized Condorcet winners, namely the “(n,q)-Condorcet winners”. In the case of social choice functions (such as those just listed) which are furthermore “top-majoritarian”, they coincide with the classical Condorcet winners.
Starting Page	331
Ending Page	347
Page Count	17
File Format	PDF
ISSN	01761714
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume Number	22
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	1432217X
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2004-01-01
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics

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Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners