NDLI: On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Tchantcho, Bertrand Diffo Lambo, Lawrence Pongou, Roland Moulen, Joël
Copyright Year	2009
Abstract	We study the core of “(j, k) simple games”, where voters choose one level of approval from among j possible levels, partitioning the society into j coalitions, and each possible partition facing k levels of approval in the output (Freixas and Zwicker in Soc Choice Welf 21:399–431, 2003). We consider the case of (j, 2) simple games, including voting games in which each voter may cast a “yes” or “no” vote, or abstain (j = 3). A necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core of such games is provided, with an important application to weighted symmetric (j, 2) simple games. These results generalize the literature, and provide a characterization of constitutions under which a society would allow a given number of candidates to compete for leadership without running the risk of political instability. We apply these results to well-known voting systems and social choice institutions including the relative majority rule, the two-thirds relative majority rule, the United States Senate, and the United Nations Security Council.
Starting Page	379
Ending Page	396
Page Count	18
File Format	PDF
ISSN	01761714
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume Number	34
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	1432217X
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2009-06-07
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Economics general Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics

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