NDLI: Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Amir, Rabah Feo, Giuseppe
Copyright Year	2013
Abstract	This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private—domestic or foreign—firm competes with a public, welfare-maximizing firm. A central goal of the paper is to present a unified and general treatment of the basic question of what constitutes the appropriate solution concept—Cournot or Stackelberg—in such duopolies. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We demonstrate that this result is due to the objective function of the public firm being increasing in the rival’s output (instead of decreasing for a private firm). We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. We make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.
Starting Page	629
Ending Page	658
Page Count	30
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	43
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2013-12-10
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Mixed markets Endogenous timing Cournot equilibrium Stackelberg equilibrium Privatization Economic Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Operations Research/Decision Theory Game Theory/Mathematical Methods
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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