NDLI: Contests with endogenous entry

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Fu, Qiang Jiao, Qian Lu, Jingfeng
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	This paper studies the effort-maximizing design of a complete-information contest with endogenous entry. A fixed pool of homogenous potential players with identical marginal bidding cost must incur an entry cost to enter the contest before they bid for prize(s). The designer can flexibly adjust the impact function of a generalized nested lottery contest and use a fixed budget to fund single or multiple prizes. Applying Dasgupta and Maskin (Rev Econ Stud 53(1):1–26, 1986), we establish the existence of symmetric equilibrium for all contest mechanisms concerned. A uniform upper bound for expected overall bids is identified for any eligible contest, assuming that potential bidders play symmetric equilibria. We show that the upper bound can be achieved through a Tullock contest with a single contingent prize, which adopts compatible bundles of success function and entry fees/subsidies. In particular, we identify the conditions under which the optimum can be achieved by solely setting the right discriminatory power in a Tullock contest with a single fixed prize. Finally, our analysis characterizes the optimal shortlisting rule, which reveals that the contest designer generally should exclude potential bidders to elicit higher bids.
Starting Page	387
Ending Page	424
Page Count	38
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	44
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2014-06-18
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Contest design Endogenous entry Entry cost Stochastic entry Economic Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Game Theory/Mathematical Methods Behavioral Economics Operations Research/Decision Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Contests with productive effort

Picking the winners

Strategically equivalent contests

Core deviation minimizing auctions

Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games

Shmuel’s introduction

Stochastic bankruptcy games

My scientific first-born

Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography

Contests with endogenous entry

Similar Documents

Contests with productive effort

Picking the winners

Strategically equivalent contests

Core deviation minimizing auctions

Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games

Shmuel’s introduction

Stochastic bankruptcy games

My scientific first-born

Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography

Contests with endogenous entry