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Optimal Mechanism Design without Money
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Gershkov, Alex Moldovanu, Benny Shi, Xianwen |
| Copyright Year | 2013 |
| Abstract | We consider the standard mechanism design environment with linear utility but without monetary transfers. We first establish an equivalence between deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes. We then use this equivalence to construct the constrained-efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.econ2.uni-bonn.de/moldovanu/discussion-paper_gershkov-moldovanu-shi-2013_optimal-mechanism-design-without-money.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |