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Mechanism Design without Money
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Boicheva, Sylvia |
| Copyright Year | 2012 |
| Abstract | Mechanism design is a field that deals with designing algorithms for making decisions based on the preferences of the agents in such a way that the outcome is guaranteed to be good for society and the agents are not incentivised to misreport their preferences. An appropriate mechanism manages to turn a group of self-interested agents into a group collectively satisfied with the decision. Most of the research on the subject is based on enforcing taxes and subsidies to compensate agents, but monetary transactions are not always applicable — for instance, buying and selling organs for transplantation is illegal. Therefore, it is important to know what can be achieved without utilizing payments. This thesis provides a broad survey of both classic and recent results in the field and points out the most important challenges and achievements. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.illc.uva.nl/Research/Publications/Reports/MoL-2012-02.text.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.illc.uva.nl/Research/Reports/MoL-2012-02.text.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.science.uva.nl/pub/theory/illc/ResearchReports/MoL-2012-02.text.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.cs.swarthmore.edu/~bryce/cs91/f18/lecture/L5B_notes.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
