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Voting , Punishment , and Public Goods By :
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Kroll, Stephan Shogren, Jason F. |
| Copyright Year | 2007 |
| Abstract | Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. Our results suggest that voting by itself does not increase cooperation, but if voters can punish violators, contributions increase significantly. While costly punishment increases contributions at the price of lower efficiency, overall efficiency for a voting-withpunishment rule still exceeds the level observed for a voting-without-punishment rule. Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll, and Jason F. Shogren (2007) "Voting, Punishment, and Public Goods" Economic Inquiry Vol. 45, No. 3 pp.557–570 Version of Record Available From (www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com) |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Cherry_todd_2007_Voting_Punishment_orig.pdf.X.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Collective intelligence Entity Name Part Qualifier - adopted Experiment Genetic Heterogeneity Jason Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Manufactured Supplies Name binding Nonlinear system Paper Small |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
