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Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Healy, Paul J. |
| Copyright Year | 2008 |
| Abstract | We consider a notion of voluntary participation for mechanism design in public goods economies in which mechanisms select public goods allocations and individuals then choose whether or not to submit their requested transfer to the central planner. The set of allocations that are robust to non-participation is shown to be sub-optimal in a wide variety of environments and may shrink to the endowment as the economy is replicated. When agents become small as the economy becomes large, any non-trivial mechanism suffers from non-participation when agents cannot be coerced to contribute. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://healy.econ.ohio-state.edu/papers/Healy-EquilibriumParticipation_WP.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://healy.econ.ohio-state.edu/papers/Healy-EquilibriumParticipation.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Holography Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Manufactured Supplies Mental Suffering Request - action |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
