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How you know you are not a brain in a vat
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Jackson, Alexander |
| Copyright Year | 2015 |
| Abstract | A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat (BIV); but she doesn’t panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not inferentially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge—she rejects that ‘Moorean’ response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological literature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that’s plausibly responsible for a sensible epistemologist coming to believe she is not a BIV. I propose she thereby knows that she is not a BIV. The particular belief-forming mechanism employed explains why she overlooks this account of how she knows she is not a BIV, making it seem that there is no way for her to know it. I argue this proposal satisfactorily resolves the skeptical puzzle. |
| Starting Page | 2799 |
| Ending Page | 2822 |
| Page Count | 24 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-015-0445-x |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/collegeofsocialsciencesandinternationalstudies/research/conferences/How_You_Know_You_Are_Not_a_Brain_In_a_Vat.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=philosophy_facpubs |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=philosophy_facpubs |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0445-x |
| Volume Number | 172 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
