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I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Magidor, Ofra |
| Copyright Year | 2018 |
| Abstract | Epistemic Externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted (not least by externalists themselves) as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual world agent and their brain-in-a-vat (BIV) counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her BIV counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this paper, I argue that there is in fact no such asymmetry: assuming epistemic externalism, both the actual world agent and their BIV counterpart are in a position to know whether or not they are envatted. After an introduction (I), I present the main argument (II). I examine to what extent the argument survives when one accepts additional externalist-friendly commitments: semantic externalism, a sensitivity condition on knowledge, and epistemic contextualism (III). Finally, I discuss the implications of my conclusion to a variety of debates in epistemology (IV). |
| Starting Page | 151 |
| Ending Page | 181 |
| Page Count | 31 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1093/arisup/aky009 |
| Volume Number | 92 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.magidor.com/uploads/9/0/4/1/90418295/biv_paper_shortened___revised___v.16_.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup%2Faky009 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |