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Online appendix to accompany “Asymptotically Optimal Prior-Free Clock Auctions” by Loertscher and Marx
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Copyright Year | 2019 |
| Abstract | In this appendix, we describe two alternative clock auction formats and illustrate the rate of convergence of the optimal prior-free clock auction. In Section 1, we describe discriminatory clock auctions in a setting in which the designer can a priori place subsets of buyers and subsets of sellers into groups of symmetric agents while allowing for asymmetries across different groups. In Section 2, we describe quasi-clock auctions that implement the Bayesian optimal mechanism in a two-sided setup without violating privacy preservation for any trading agents other than the marginal pair. In Section 3, we discuss and illustrate rates of convergence. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~marx/bio/papers/PriorFree_OnlineApp.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
