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Appendix to : Optimizing Prices in Descending Clock Auctions †
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Nguyen, Tri-Dung |
| Copyright Year | 2014 |
| Abstract | In each round of the descending clock auction, the auctioneer needs to offer each active bidder a price, i.e., to do Step 2.1. of Algorithm 1. Here we show a dynamic programming model that the optimal set of offer prices should solve. Let V (m,S,u, l) be the minimum expected payment that the auctioneer needs to pay to the bidders in a descending clock auction with m rounds, with a set of active bidders S, with upper bounds u and lower bounds l within which the bidders’ valuations lie. Let ξ be a realization of the bidders’ values. For any offer prices p in the first round, the state of the auction by the end of that first round will be as follows. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/descendingClockAuction.ec14.Appendices.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
