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CEO Compensation Among Firms Controlled by Large Shareholders: Evidence from Emerging Markets
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Gallego, F. J. LarraĆn, B. Felipe |
| Copyright Year | 2010 |
| Abstract | Using a novel data base for three emerging markets, we find that the type of large shareholder matters for CEO compensation. In particular, we find a compensation premium of about 30 log points for professional (not controller-related) CEOs working in firms controlled by a family compared to firms controlled by other large shareholders. The premium cannot be explained away by standard firm characteristics, observable executive skills (e.g., education or tenure), or the compensation of the CEO in her former job. The premium comes mostly from family firms with absent founders and when sons are involved. |
| Starting Page | 1 |
| Ending Page | 1 |
| Page Count | 1 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.1718704 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://economia.uc.cl/docs/dt_379.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1718704 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |